

The UN's political role in a transitional international moment

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Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has taken office at a time of significant turbulence in international politics. As the Secretary-General and his new 'cabinet' begin to take stock of the UN's agenda and relevant capacities, they face several sets of challenges. Some of these emerge from the terrain character of conflict; some from the transitional international political environment; others from a growing band of competitors; and some from the UN itself.

This brief note traces some of these challenges through the lens of their potential impact on the space available to the UN to play a political role in conflict and crisis management; and sets out some elements of possible strategy to navigate the likely turbulence ahead. As a brief background note, it is necessarily cursory in its treatment of these issues, and designed primarily to spark debate in the context of the OSLO forum 2007.

Evolving challenges

A shifting terrain of conflict

Although there is obvious danger in commenting on trends early on in their formation, the years since 9/11 do seem to exhibit a number of changing features of conflict:

A continuing decline in internal wars. The overall decline in the level of internal war world-wide since the mid 1990s has been well documented, most emphatically by the 2005 *Human Security Report*, and the recent 2007 update to that report shows a continuing decline, notably in sub-Saharan Africa.²

The Report notes however that this decline in wars has occurred in large parts through the fact of wars ending through mediation, a good thing surely, but historically a less stable way to end wars than victory by one party. Mediated settlements to internal wars thus bring with them a significant risk of relapse and therefore the challenge of preventing recurrence of conflict. This is an issue that will have to be grappled with, primarily through the lens of integrated missions and the broader political and peacebuilding strategies that must accompany them (and that so far appear to be eluding the newly activated Peacebuilding Commission.)

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A rise in inter-state conflict, including conflict involving major powers. The Human Security Report update notes that outside of sub-Saharan Africa, all other regions have seen a slight up-tick in the number of overall conflicts between 2002 and 2005. Unlike in the 1990s, several of these have involved major powers. The six years since 9/11 have seen the US engage in war (for self-defence) in Afghanistan and (for more confused reasons) in Iraq; lead efforts to impose sanctions and other Security Council-based measures on Syria and Iran; and engage in a high-stakes diplomatic effort to manage nuclear outbreak in North Korea. The years since 2000 have also seen cross-border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea; Israel and Lebanon; and near misses between India and Pakistan, and Nigeria and Cameroon, to name just two. Also simmering are several separatist or potentially separatist conflicts that impact on regional or rising powers' interests: in Kosovo (the EU, Russia), Moldova (Russia), Aceh (Indonesia, Australia), and Sri Lanka (India).

A rise in sub-regional conflict formations. In several regions – notably West Africa, the Horn and Central Africa, and the Middle East – 'internal' armed conflicts have taken on an increasingly cross-border character, including aggressive interference (at the least) from neighbours and the rise of cross-border networks of licit and illicit economic actors (especially trans-national organized criminal networks.)

Conflicts involving terrorist organizations. In a significant sub-set of conflict cases traditionally approached by the UN through a civil war framework, parties to the conflict have been designated as 'terrorist organizations' by significant states (and not just the United States), confronting the UN with a major political and operational challenge – e.g. in Palestine, Colombia, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Syria, etc.

This is an uncomfortable issue for the UN. On the one hand, many senior UN officials hesitate about the fact that strong US opposition to any party engaging with such groups poses a significant obstacle to UN engagement with them. On the other hand, the US, quite apart from being the superpower, is a P5 member with substantial ability to shape UN policy on peace and security questions, and is often supported in its stance (tacitly or publicly) by other powerful actors – other P5 members, significant Arab states, etc. Many believe that the SG or at least his Envoys should be able to talk to any actor regardless of P5 views, and note that in past conflicts the UN has often played its most important role precisely by being able to talk to actors that more powerful entities could not. On the other hand, it is also fair to say that the UN has with equal frequency tread carefully about engaging political groupings that are not recognized by concerned powers as being legitimate interlocutors.

On this issue, the absence of a definition of terrorism at the UN poses a continuing obstacle. Because there is no agreed UN definition as to what constitutes a terrorist organization, there can be no agreed UN list or similar; thus, any given group may be on the American, or European, or Chinese 'list' of terrorist organizations, but where those designations are contested, as they frequently are, accepting that designation creates the risk of appearing to be following one power's approach to a conflict, rather than an impartial one. The issue is certainly confused, as well as contested: why are the Janjaweed, who deliberately attack civilians for political and strategic purposes, not designated as terrorists, while the Tamil Tigers are?

Here, the issue depends very greatly on the question of whether or not it is the Secretary-General's independent good offices that is the critical UN political role; or whether that central political role is vested rather in the Security Council (and thus primarily the P5), which maintains responsibility for international peace and security. Where the Security Council has determined that a given group or state should be dealt with through a specific political framework (as it did by imposing sanctions on Taliban-led Afghanistan before 9/11, and as it is through its approach to Iran and to Syria) the Secretary-General has minimal power or authority to demur. On the other hand, the Secretary-General does have a responsibility to consider the impact of UNSC positions on the UN's ever-larger field presence, which has at times been complicated by Council stances.

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In short, a highly complex conflict terrain, much more complex than the terrain of humanitarian crises, primarily in Africa, through which the UN developed its political and operational role in the 1990s; and one further complicated by broader international tensions.

The international political context

Quite apart from the UN, the international political arena is undergoing significant turbulence. Some of this turbulence may make life easier for the UN in the short-term, but more often, it will be complicating.

International tensions are rising. What could be labeled 'strategic polarization' among major international players is manifest in various ways, including in international institutions, especially the UN.

Much of this relates to the United States. Poll after poll tells us that the standing of the United States in the world is at a historic low and that tensions between specific countries/regions and the US (sometimes broadened to the West as a whole) are high.

Such tensions are evident in great power relations. Perhaps this is most notable in the increase in rhetoric from Russian President Putin that is sharply critical, even condemnatory, of US policies. Even more important is the nature of US-China tensions – these were strikingly high at the UN in 2006, but to some extent this was personalized against US Ambassador Bolton. Significant problems remain on the agenda, but it is also the case that, albeit with ups and downs, China worked closely with the US to contain the North Korea crisis, and that there has been a narrowing of differences (very late) on Darfur.

International tensions are of course very much evident in the Arab world, especially around the questions of the US presence in Iraq and of US policy on Palestine (and more recently, on the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.) There are important complexities here, however. Perhaps most important is that growing anti-US rhetoric among Arab leaders masks important shifts by those same leaders towards efforts towards an renewed alliance with the US (and therefore peace moves towards Israel) in order to bolster their common defence against Iran. The growing gulf between

those governments unofficial policy and their populations' perception of international politics is a minefield, not just for the UN.

US bogged down in Iraq. It is too early to judge conclusively whether the "surge" strategy combined with a more engaged stance by US Secretary of State Rice will pay off in terms of either an improving security/political situation in Iraq or improving sub-regional and regional dynamics. What is not too early to judge is that between now and the US elections, the issue of Iraq will overwhelmingly dominate the US political and policy process. Only the outbreak of a major crisis in Iran has the potential to re-orient that focus. This has costs and benefits for the UN's political role: it makes the US less able and less tempted to take on new large-scale endeavours on their own, and is driving a more diplomatic, P5 oriented strategy in State Department. On the other hand, it means that where US leadership is irreplaceable, it will be absent, or partial, or delayed.

US election season is upon us. Further, although there are 18 months left in the term of President Bush, the US election season is in full swing. While not quite yet a lame duck, President Bush's ability to shape foreign policy will be more and more constrained in the coming months, as Republican members of the House and Senate increasingly seek to distance themselves from Bush's Iraq policy. Many international actors are already looking ahead to the question of foreign policy under a new President, Democratic or Republican, and will hold fire on significant issues (for good or ill) until such time as a new US leader is in place. By the same token, states or actors seeking space to manoeuvre in regional or international conflicts may seek to use the remaining period of a weakened Presidency to gain advantage.

The leadership, or policy, of major actors is in flux. France has and the UK will shortly officially have a new leader in office. The potential impact of this is significant, given how closely both Blair and Chirac (less so of late) worked with SG Annan in his political capacity. Moreover, a shift towards a more Atlanticist stance in the Elysée Palace (probably) and away from a too-close US alliance stance in 10 Downing Street (perhaps) will signal a shift in the P3 alliances and arrangements that have been a major factor in shaping UNSC dynamics and thus SG political space in the past 10 years. Less specific but no less important are changing foreign policies in both Delhi and Beijing, in the former case exemplified by the US-India nuclear deal, in the later case now personified by a new Foreign Minister.

Leadership changes at other institutions. The (anticipated) near-term departure of EU High-Representative Javier Solana will remove from the scene perhaps the most significant institutional actor other than the SG, but one who worked closely with SG Annan and the UN on a wide-range of non-European crises and conflicts. Similarly, the departure of Paul Wolfowitz from the World Bank will bring another round in the UN-World Bank relationship. Whether a new Bank President and a still-new Secretary-General can forge a more effective relationship than has held over the past decade remains to be seen. The absence of existing relationships between the leaders of these critical institutions is good and bad: lacking a reservoir of trust, but also baggage free.

Institutional competition

While confronting the above two sets of factors, the UN will be shaping its political role in a crowded and competitive field.

A crowded field. The number of institutional, governmental, and non-governmental competitors to the UN's political and mediation role has grown steadily since the mid 1990s. But while even in the late 1990s many of these actors were episodic, poorly structured, inexperienced or institutionally immature, this has changed much of late. Mediation successes by Norway, Switzerland, and the EU High Representative, along with NGOs like HDC and others, signify a new maturity to non-UN mediation actors.

Europe and the EU. This is perhaps most important when it comes to Europe. The EU's foreign policy machinery has begun to mature, and the proliferation of EU representatives constitutes a significant potential source of competition (or, possibly, collaboration) for UN mediation. As noted above, a likely change in personality at the helm of the EU's foreign policy machinery has uncertain consequences for the UN. Moreover, it is quite likely that continuing maturity of these structures will push European governments, which during the last 10 years were the bulwark of UN financial and political support, towards their own rather than global mechanisms.

The 'like-minded' go forum shopping. Moreover, a combination of the bitter experience of Iraq, perceptions that the World Summit reform effort failed to heal divisions or devise effective UN solutions, the warp and woof of US policy, new maturity in European institutions, and scandals at the UN have all combined to produce in the policy approaches of the 'like-minded' a new scepticism about the UN. As the UN's greatest backers during the expansionist 1990s, a shift in attitude among this group will create new pressures and new challenges for the UN, and could spur the further development of institutional competitors or alternative mechanisms. (In some respects, it could be healthy: some 'tough love' from states that are ultimately committed to UN success could be tonic in so-far stilted reform debates.)

UN-specific factors

While navigating all of these factors, however, the UN will be facing a number of its own 'issues'.

The UN's reputation has been tarnished in the eyes of many by its too-early engagement in post-occupation Iraq. Although this is unquestionably true, the dimensions of this issue are poorly understood (to this day, the UN has done no serious international polling of perception of this issue.) There is no question but that there are new questions and critiques about the UN's political alignment, both in specific cases and in general, but what consequences this has is more complex.

For example, the brutal killing of SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello and 21 other UN staff members and associates in Baghdad is often cited as evidence of the UN

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having been seen as too close to the US occupation authorities; but there is no actual evidence to this effect; and the fact that the ICRC, certainly not tainted by association with the occupation authorities, was similarly attacked some weeks later should give pause for thought. Indeed, a more persuasive conclusion was that the UN and the ICRC both were attacked because as agents of stabilization and humanitarian action, respectively, they were interfering with the core agenda of those (whether Al Qaeda affiliates, Baathists, or others) who sought to destabilize and to inflict suffering as a strategic tool.

Moreover, this argument is often made about other contexts with reference to a rise in attacks on humanitarian and UN personnel as evidence of the growth in anti-UN sentiment based on perceptions that the UN is too close to the US and too associated with occupations, the global war on terror, or other presumed ills. All fine and well, except that the evidence supports a more nuanced conclusion. A detailed study of attacks on UN and NGO civilian personnel revealed that taken as a percentage of overall number of personnel in the field, the level of attacks was actually almost flat; that there was indeed a slight decline in the overall percentage of international personnel that had come under attack, with a compensating rise in the number of local personnel; and that being deployed in an integrated mission, or alongside P5 forces or occupation authorities had no significant impact on levels of attacks.³ More worryingly, a country by country breakdown of this data shows a far higher average level of attacks in predominantly Muslim countries.

Ban's unformed reputation. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, a critical actor in shaping the overall political space available to the UN (though not necessarily in every mission context, as Teresa Whitfield has noted), is new to the scene and does not as yet have an established reputation as a mediator and political actor at the global level. This is good and bad: lack of baggage, but also a lack of established trust.

A generation of SRSGs passes from the scene. Meanwhile many of the 'big-name' SRSGs have left or are about to leave UN service. Brahimi and de Soto have retired; Ahtisaari will not likely engage in major new ventures; and de Mello was tragically killed in Iraq. Larsen remains engaged in the UN, but not full-time. Only a handful of 'rising stars' were cultivated by Annan and are currently in active service. This represents the loss of massive negotiation experience – though of course also an opportunity for fresh blood to be recruited.

UN peacekeeping faces risks with reputational consequences for the UN's political role. In several mission contexts – notably Somalia, Sudan, and Lebanon – the UN is engaged in peacekeeping ventures that carry substantial risks of failure and/or attack. In some of these contexts, notably Darfur and Chad, the ambitious goals initially set by the Security Council for UN operations are being scaled back. In other contexts, such as Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire, local resistance to an expansive UN role has constrained or curtailed UN peacekeeping presences. The consequences to the UN should peacekeeping experience a significant political downturn would not be limited to peacekeeping, but would impose substantial reputational negatives on the UN's broader conflict/crisis management role.

New constraints on the SG's role. SG Annan's reform bid was taken by some member states as an excessive bid for authority by the SG, and not just in the management arena. This has occasioned among several member states, especially middle powers in Asia, a sense of wanting to re-assert member states control over the organization, away from an SG/Secretariat dominated period. This coincides with a re-assertion of US interest in influencing the organization, as well as a rising sense in China of an ability to play a pro-active role through the permanent seat on the Security Council. The combination is resulting in a sharp decline (for now) in the extent to which the Security Council looks to the SG for leadership or policy frameworks; rather, the current mode is very much P5 led. This trend is complicated by the deep reservoirs of distrust of the P5 that have been built up within the UN and among many regions and regional powers.

Strategies for response

Adapting to all of the above will require effective strategy. What follows are some possible elements thereof (necessarily cursory in their treatment.)

1. Get war recurrence right

This may seem a surprising place to start for a note on political strategy; but the UN has developed a clear market lead and a solid reputation in peacekeeping, and should current peacekeeping missions, or follow-up offices, preside over relapse into violence in several or in significant cases, not only the peacekeeping role will suffer. Preventing war recurrence is a critical test and the most obvious place where the UN can effectively prevent further war. This will involve continuing to strengthen the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) yes; but also the refashioning of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to allow it to play the role of articulating, in consultation with the UN Security Council (UNSC) and regional actors, a broad political strategy that can underpin and undergird peacekeeping operations. There is widespread political support for strengthening the Secretary-General's good offices function, and a strengthened DPA is a necessary corollary.

Also necessary will be fashioning effective relationships between the UN's political actors on the one hand, and the major development actors on the other (bilaterals, the World Bank, the IMF, regional development banks and UNDP) to help states emerging from conflict build the necessary institutional infrastructure to successfully transition from peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations to self-sustaining peace. The early efforts of the Peacebuilding Commission are not yet yielding this result, though it is too early to write off that institution; rather, a focus on avoiding war recurrence, and to that end laying the necessary economic and political foundations of sustained recovery, can help focus its work.

2. Manage regional variation

The UN has important political roles in Africa, the Middle East, increasingly Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Balkans. These roles vary widely across

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regions (and within them) and warrant not only differentiated strategies but different capacities. This can be highlighted by considering the very different political roles the UN plays in two regions, and potentially in a third.

In the Middle East, new security realities are being forged by the combustible combination of turmoil in Iraq, Iran's search for a nuclear deterrent, and (partially as a consequence of these two issues) a rise in Sunni/Shia tension across the region, as well as the descent of Palestine and Lebanon into political/factional fighting. The UN is differentially embedded in each of these theatres: institutionally, through the IAEA's role in Iran; politically, through the SG's good offices and the UNSC's resolutions on Iran, Syria and Lebanon; and through its peacekeeping presences (UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNTSO). The growing connections between different aspects of the region bring added salience to the UN role, but also substantial risks: not only is its ability to perform its role vulnerable to shifting priorities of the major powers and regional actors, the political consequences of perceived or attributed failure in any one of these theaters could be dramatic. Complicating this still further is that the definition of dramatic failure varies widely between different important audiences.

In Central Africa and the Horn, by contrast, the UN faces a burgeoning (if occasionally ambivalent) demand for its peacekeeping role, with new missions now mandated for Darfur, Chad, CAR and Somalia. Whether these missions come to fruition remains to be seen. If not, the UN faces a firestorm of criticism about its inability to come to terms with major internal chaos, massive human rights abuses, and regional contagion. If yes, it faces the prospect of overstretched, over-burdened and vulnerable peacekeepers in contested mission areas.

It is worth also mentioning in this regard apparently rising inter-state tensions in North Asia. During SG Annan's final tour of Asia, including stops in Beijing and Tokyo, there were tentative feelers put out in terms of whether or not he personally might take on a political role, albeit a discrete one, in addressing the rising nationalism in China, Japan, and Korea. The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is a source of additional concern. The question of whether or not the UN has a comparative advantage in this terrain is open, as is the question of whether the current SG has the opportunity to play a role on these issues.

What is striking is how *different* these challenges are. Outside of southern Lebanon, the UN's role in the Middle East is political, media-sensitive, and directly engages major P5 and international capitals at the leaders' level. In the Horn and Central Africa, the UN's role is hugely operational, and suffers precisely from the lack of sustained, high-level political will. In North Asia, the role (if feasible) would require very discreet, sustained dialogue between and within very influential member states. Organizing one institution to deal effectively with these and other variants poses significant political, managerial and operational difficulties.

3. Broaden the spectrum of political cooperation – the P5 plus

On emerging conflicts and crises, it will likely be the Security Council more than the SG that takes the lead in shaping the political framework for response. For

the SG, the implications of this are clear: although the SG must preserve some degree of independent political space, an effective role will require very, very close cooperation and coordination with Washington and Beijing and the other three permanent members.

Here, however, recent experience suggests that a P5-led process will be insufficient. Including other key actors as relevant to the politics of the case has proven critically important to Security Council effectiveness and UN legitimacy in several recent cases – with Germany and the EU on Iran, with South Africa on Burundi, and with Saudi Arabia on Lebanon. The role of Japan in the six-party process for North Korea is a non-UN case in point. The SG's opportunity will often lie in helping the Security Council orchestrate communication and joint strategy making between these players. UN operational roles that emerge from joint action by P5-plus groupings are more likely to be perceived as legitimate and thus to be sustainable.

4. Cooperate with other actors

Bringing regional powers in is one option; another is working with regional organizations or other non-UN multilateral actors.

One of the reasons that UN peacekeeping has grown so substantially and successfully in the last six years is that that period coincides with a change in attitude at the UN, away from resistance against regional and non-UN entities, and towards cooperation with them. The birth of so-called "hybrid" operations gave UN peacekeeping access to a wide range of operational resources, whether used to prepare the ground for UN peacekeeping, or to secure its continuing presence, or similar. It also opened up political space by bringing emerging regional actors (especially the EU and the AU) into the political process surrounding operations.

The successful management of the UN's political role in the coming period, particularly in terms of the SG's good offices, is likely to require the same approach: cooperation not competition. There is already substantial precedent for this, both in the Quartet in the Middle East (where the SG performs his political function alongside the US, the EU and Russia), a mechanism that has been repeatedly backed by the UNSC, notwithstanding substantial internal controversy about its positions; in the Balkans, where Ahtisaari serves as a UN Envoy but in practice also as the senior European diplomat on the issue; and on Iran, where the EU's Solana led the diplomatic charge, but in active collaboration with IAEA Director El-Baradai. And this precedent casts back to an earlier mode of the use of 'Friends groups' in peacemaking.⁴

The recently established Mediation Support Unit gives the Department of Political Affairs an important vehicle through which to support this kind of cooperation, and effective use of the MSU will be important in shaping other actors' receptivity on an ongoing basis to joint efforts with the UN.⁵

5. Build personnel

Ultimately, the UN's political role is vested in people. The passing from the scene of several of the Boutros-Ghali/Annan-era SRSGs means that the UN will have

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to identify a new cadre of senior envoys and representatives, or substantially increase its ability to identify and develop talent within. Substantial talent does exist within the body of the institution, both in serving SRSGs and Deputy SRSGs who are accumulating substantial experience and skill; in P5/D1 level staff within the Secretariat who have gained (unlike their generational predecessors) very high levels of field and political experience within the UN over the past ten years. There are also substantial (and often neglected) reservoirs of talent in the humanitarian and field-oriented funds, programs and agencies; deployment of such personnel into integrated missions and political missions has to date been frequently successful.

In addition to developing talent from within, however, the nature of the strategic terrain facing the UN should place a premium on recruiting into the organization experienced mediators / mediation support capacities from outside bodies, such as the EU, the AU and experienced member states. This would help to forge the kinds of personal inter-connections that will be critical in making collaborative approaches to mediation work effectively.

Lingering questions

Adoption of these strategies or variants would, however, leave unanswered at least two major policy questions relating to the UN's political role: first, how should the UN relate to the question of substantial terrorist organizations, especially where these have gained institutionalized (especially elected) political roles? This partly relates to the problem of whether and how to engage such groups when 'engagement' can be seen as legitimating. Second, should the Secretary-General or Secretariat play some sort of role in mitigating broader international tensions among Member States – a question that is closely related to the first, given current international fault-lines.

By aspiration and ambition, the UN will need to find some way to grapple with this latter question. By recent experience, however, the UN is more likely to be a forum in which tensions get vented (and sometimes intensified) rather than resolved, often because they cannot be vented elsewhere or because venting at the UN is not seen as costly to other issues on Member States' respective bilateral agendas. If so, the Secretary-General will find himself repeatedly caught between irreconcilable positions.

The middle ground here is for the UN to refashion itself and its practices in a way that it can become a forum within which or through which these tensions can be managed, mitigated or in some cases collectively confronted – most critically on the treatment of terrorist groups and political groupings that overlap with terrorist organizations. This will require some shifts among the UN's major political actors – both leading Member States (especially the P5) and the Secretary-General and his key political lieutenants, both in the field and headquarters. Here again it will be essential for the P5 to bring into the political and crisis management process other relevant powers. This can be on a case-by-case basis but it needs to be serious and sustained.

None of this will work, of course, unless the UN also address a further challenge – the weakness of its communication capacity vis-à-vis an evolving world of media. This issue is of course well beyond this already too broad note. Suffice it to say that until the UN is able to effectively explain its stance on the questions of terrorism simultaneously on Fox News and Al Jazeera, it will continue to be buffeted between divergent political forces, rather than fulfilling its core charter functions: either to find peaceful settlements of disputes; or to organize genuinely collective action against common threats.

Conclusion

In a world of mounting international tensions, turbulence at the leadership level, and institutional competition, the worst case scenario for the UN is that it will find itself limited even in its ability to define common threats, let alone to galvanize action against them.

The core political challenges for the Secretary-General will be, in the first instance, managing several balancing acts: distinguishing when it should lead and when it should follow; accommodating the reality of P5-plus dominance while heeding the necessity of maintaining a distinctive voice; finding a way both to mobilize the Membership while also trying to be a forum for reconciling divisions among them. Developing the UN's political role in a way that is trusted by the P5, at a moment when the P5 have lost the trust of just about everyone else, is essential. Building effective, cooperative relationships with an array of major emerging powers and broader international constituencies will likely be the key to surviving this tricky balance. ■

Endnotes

- 1 Co-Director and Senior Fellow, NYU Center on International Cooperation. Dr. Jones was previously deputy research director for the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and a member of SG Annan's reform team in the lead-up to the World Summit 2005. He previously served as chief of staff in the UN's mission in the Middle East, as policy advisor in the UN mission in Kosovo, on the planning staff of the UN mission for East Timor, and in OCHA at headquarters. Thanks to Richard Gowan, Elizabeth Cousens, Catherine Bellamy and Antonio Potter for comments on previous drafts.
- 2 Human Security Report 2005; and 2007 Update.
- 3 Center on International Cooperation; http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/aidworkers_final.pdf
- 4 See Teresa Whitfield, *Friends Indeed? The Role of Friends Groups in Peacemaking*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, Forthcoming.
- 5 For more on reform of the political elements of the Secretariat, see in particular Thant Myint-U and Amy Scott, *The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (1945–2006)*, New York: International Peace Academy, 2006.